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Abstract
Recent advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence are now being considered in safety-critical
autonomous systems where software defects may cause severe harm to humans and the environment. Design
organizations in these domains are currently unable to provide convincing arguments that their systems are
safe to operate when machine learning algorithms are used to implement their software.
In this paper, we present an efficient method to extract equivalence classes from decision trees and tree
ensembles, and to formally verify that their input-output mappings comply with requirements. The idea is
that, given that safety requirements can be traced to desirable properties on system input-output patterns,
we can use positive verification outcomes in safety arguments. This paper presents the implementation of
the method in the tool VoTE (Verifier of Tree Ensembles), and evaluates its scalability on two case studies
presented in current literature. We demonstrate that our method is practical for tree ensembles trained on
low-dimensional data with up to 25 decision trees and tree depths of up to 20. Our work also studies the
limitations of the method with high-dimensional data and preliminarily investigates the trade-off between
large number of trees and time taken for verification.
Keywords: Formal verification, Decision tree, Tree ensemble, Random forest, Gradient boosting machine
1. Introduction
In recent years, artificial intelligence utilizing machine learning algorithms has begun to outperform
humans at several tasks, e.g. playing board games [24] and diagnosing skin cancer [8]. These advances are
now being considered in safety-critical autonomous systems where software defects may cause severe harm
to humans and the environment, e.g airborne collision avoidance systems [13].
Several researchers have raised concerns [4, 15, 21] regarding the lack of verification methods for these
kinds of systems in which machine learning algorithms are used to train software deployed in the system.
Machine learning models with large sets of parameters are hard to interpret. Humans are currently unable
to provide convincing arguments that data used to test and train these models is sufficient, and exhaustive
testing is generally intractable.
Instead, various formal methods are explored to address this issue. Most research is so far focused on the
verification of neural networks, but there are other models that may be more appropriate when verifiability
is important, e.g. decision trees [2], random forests [3] and gradient boosting machines [9]. Their structural
simplicity makes them easy to analyze systematically, but large (yet simple) models may still prove hard to
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verify due to combinatorial explosion. This paper is an improved and substantially extended version of our
previous work [25] where we developed a method to partition the input domain of decision trees into disjoint
sets, and to explore all path combinations in random forests in such a way that counteracts combinatorial
path explosions. We implemented our method in a tool named VoRF, and evaluated the method on two
case studies found in current literature. Compared to previous works, the contributions of this paper are as
follows.
• A generalization to include more tree ensembles, e.g. gradient boosting machines, with an updated
tool support (VoTE).
• A Soundness proof of the associated approximation technique used for this purpose.
• An improved node selection strategy that yields significant speed improvements in our case studies.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents preliminaries on decision trees, tree
ensembles, and a couple of interesting properties subject to verification. Section 3 discusses related works
on formal verification and machine learning, and Section 4 presents our method with our supporting tool
VoTE. Section 5 presents applications of our method on two case studies; a collision detection problem, and
a digit recognition problem. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and summarizes the lessons we learned.
2. Preliminaries
Government agencies from several countries have agreed upon guidelines [5, 11] to help design organi-
zations from different industries with assuring quality in software with safety-critical applications. Several
methods described in these guidelines rely on human experts to analyze the software. However, manually
analyzing large and complex software developed by machine learning algorithms is difficult.
Within the avionics sector, we have the publication of guidelines [6] that describe how design organiza-
tions may apply formal methods to the verification of safety-critical software. Applying these methods to
complex and safety-critical software is a non-trivial task due to practical limitations in computing power,
and challenges in qualifying complex verification tools. These challenges are often caused by a high ex-
pressiveness provided by the language in which the software is implemented in. Hence, we address these
challenges by selecting machine learning models based on their simplicity rather than their expressiveness.
2.1. Decision Trees
In machine learning, decision trees are used as predictive models to capture statistical properties of a
system of interest.
Definition 1 (Decision Tree). A decision tree implements a prediction function t : Xn → Rm that maps
disjoint sets of points Xi ⊂ Xn to a single output point y¯i ∈ Rm, i.e.
t(x¯) =

(y1,1, . . . , y1,m) x¯ ∈ X1
...
(yk,1, . . . , yk,m) x¯ ∈ Xk,
where k is the number of disjoint sets and Xn =
k⋃
i=1
Xi.
For perfectly balanced binary decision trees, k = 2d, where d is the tree depth. Each internal node is
associated with a decision function that separate points in the input space from each other, and the leaves
define output values. The n-dimensional input domain Xn includes elements x¯ as tuples in which each
element xi captures some feature of the system of interest as an input variable. The tree structure is
evaluated in a top-down manner, where decision functions determine which path to take towards the leaves.
2
x ≤ 0
1
true
2
false
Figure 1: A decision tree with two possible outputs, depending on the value of single input variable x.
When a leaf is hit, the output y¯ ∈ Rm associated with the leaf is emitted. Figure 1 depicts a decision tree
with one decision function (x ≤ 0) and two outputs (1 and 2).
In general, decision functions are defined by non-linear combinations of several input variables at each
internal node. In this paper, we only consider binary trees with linear decision functions with one input
variable, which Irsoy et al. call univariate hard decision trees [10]. As illustrated by Figure 2, a univariate
hard decision tree forms hyperrectangles (boxes) that split the input space along axes in the coordinate
system.
x1
x2
x¯ ∈ X1
x¯ ∈ X2
x¯ ∈ X3
Figure 2: The input space of a univariate hard decision tree, which splits the input space along axes in the coordinate system,
thus forming boxes.
2.2. Random Forests
Decision trees are known to suffer from a phenomenon called overfitting. Models suffering from this
phenomenon can be fitted so tightly to their training data that their performance on unseen data is reduced
the more you train them. To counteract these effects in decision trees, Breiman [3] proposes random forests.
Definition 2 (Random Forest). A random forest f : Xn → Rm is an ensemble of B decision trees that
produces outputs by averaging the values emitted by each individual tree, i.e.
f(x¯) = 1
B
B∑
b=1
tb(x¯),
where tb is the b-th tree in the ensemble.
To reduce correlation between trees, each tree is trained on a random subset of the training data, using
potentially overlapping random subsets of the input variables.
2.3. Gradient Boosting Machines
Similarly, Freidman [9] introduces a machine learning model called gradient boosting machine that uses
several decision trees to implement a prediction function. Unlike random forests, these trees are trained
in a sequential manner. Each consecutive tree tries to compensate for errors made by previous trees by
estimating the gradient of errors (using gradient decent, hence the name). In a learning context, this is
conceptually very different from random forests, but during prediction, these two models have many things
in common.
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Definition 3 (Gradient Boosting Machine). A gradient boosting machine f : Xn → Rm is an ensemble
of B additive decision trees, i.e.
f(x¯) =
B∑
b=1
tb(x¯),
where tb is the b-th tree in the ensemble.
Typically, trees in a gradient boosting machine are significantly shallower than trees in a random forest,
often with a tree depth in the range 2-10. Gradient boosting machines instead capture complexity by growing
more trees.
2.4. Classifiers
Decision trees and tree ensembles may also be used as classifiers. A classifier is a function that categorizes
samples from an input domain into one or more classes. In this paper, we only consider functions that map
each point from an input domain to exactly one class.
Definition 4 (Classifier). Let f(x¯) = (y1, . . . , ym) be a model trained to predict the probability yi asso-
ciated with a class i within disjoint regions in the input domain, where m is the number of classes. Then
we would expect that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1, and
m∑
i=1
yi = 1. A classifier fc(x¯) may then be defined as
fc(x¯) = argmax
i
yi.
A random forest typically infers probabilities by capturing the number of times a particular class has been
observed within some hyperrectangle in the input domain of a tree during training. Training a gradi-
ent boosting machines to predict class membership probabilities is somewhat different, depending on the
characteristics of the used learning algorithm, and often involves post-processing the sum of all trees. For
example, when training multiclass classifiers in CatBoost [19], individual trees emit values from a logarithmic
domain that are summed up, and finally transformed and normalized into probabilities using the softmax
function, i.e.
softmax(y1, . . . , ym) =
(ey1 , . . . , eym)
m∑
i=1
yi
2.5. Safety Properties
In this paper, we consider two properties commonly used in related works; robustness against noise and
plausibility of range1. Note that compliance with these two properties alone is generally not sufficient to
ensure safety. System safety engineers typically define requirements on software functions that are richer
than these two properties alone.
Property 1 (Robustness against Noise). Let f : Xn → Rm be the function subject to verification,
 ∈ R≥0 a robustness margin, and ∆ = {δ ∈ R : − < δ < } noise. We denote by δ¯ an n-tuple of elements
drawn from ∆. The function is robust against noise iff
∀x¯ ∈ Xn, ∀δ¯ ∈ ∆n, f(x¯) = f(x¯+ δ¯).
Pulina and Tacchella [20] define a stability property that is similar to our notion of robustness here but use
scalar noise.
1Other works [20] refer to this property as “global safety”. To avoid confusion with the dependability term “safety”, we
instead refer to this property as “plausibility of range”.
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Property 2 (Plausibility of Range). Let f : Xn → Rm be the function subject to verification. The
function has a desired plausibility of range when its output values are within a stated boundary, i.e.
∀x¯ ∈ Xn,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, f(x¯) = (y1, . . . , ym), αi ≤ yi ≤ βi.
for some αi, βi ∈ R.
In classification problems, the output tuple (y1, . . . , ym) contains probabilities, and thus αi = 0 and βi = 1.
3. Related Works
Due to the extreme progress made in the application of machine learning in artificial intelligence, aware-
ness regarding its (lack of) security and safety have increased. Researchers from several fields are now
addressing these problems in their own way, often in collaboration between fields [23]. We group the related
works in two categories; those that directly verify neural networks, and those that verify tree-based models.
3.1. Formal Verification of Neural Networks
There have been extensive research on formal verification of neural networks. Pulina and Tacchella [20]
combine SMT solvers with an abstraction-refinement technique to analyze neural networks with non-linear
activation functions. They conclude that formal verification of realistically sized networks is still an open
challenge. Scheibler et al. [22] use bounded model checking to verify a non-linear neural network controlling
an inverted pendulum. They encode the neural network and differential equations of the system as an SMT
formula, and try to verify properties without success. These works [20, 22] suggest that SMT solvers are
currently unable to verify realistic non-linear neural networks.
In [12], Ivanov et al. successfully verify safety properties of non-linear neural networks trained to approx-
imate closed-loop control systems. Their approach exploit the fact that the sigmoid function is a solution
to a quadratic differential equation, which enables them to transform sigmoid-based neural networks into
an equivalent non-linear hybrid system. They then leverage existing verification tools for hybrid systems
to verify the reachability property. Even though verification of non-linear hybrid systems is undecidable in
general, existing methods work on many practical examples.
Katz et al. [14] combine the simplex method with a SAT solver to verify properties of deep neural networks
with piecewise linear activation functions. They successfully verify domain-specific safety properties of a
prototype airborne collision avoidance system trained using reinforcement learning. The verified neural
network contains a total of 300 nodes organized into 6 layers. Ehlers [7] combines an LP solver with a
modified SAT solver to verify neural networks. His method includes a technique to approximate the overall
behavior of the network to reduce the search space for the SAT solver. The method is evaluated on two case
studies; a collision detection problem, and a digit recognition problem. We reuse these two case studies in
our work, and also provide a global approximation of the overall model (in our cases, tree ensembles).
Mirman et al. [17] use abstract interpretation to verify robustness of neural networks with convolution
and fully connected layers. They evaluate their method on four image classification problems (one of which
we use in our work), and demonstrate promising performance. In our work, we address similar verification
problems, but for tree ensembles. Since decision trees and tree ensembles are generally easier to analyze
systematically than neural networks, we expect that formal verification methods scale better when applied
to decision trees and tree ensembles compared to neural networks. More importantly, the simplicity of our
method allows implementations such as VoTE to be certified for online use in safety-critical applications.
3.2. Formal Verification of Decision Trees and Tree Ensembles
The fact that decision trees may be easier to verify than neural networks is demonstrated by Bastani
et al. [1]. They train a neural network to play the game Pong, then extract a decision tree policy from
the trained neural network. The extracted tree is significantly easier to verify than the neural network,
which they demonstrate by formally verifying properties within seconds using an of-the-shelf SMT solver.
Our method provides even better performance when verifying decision trees. However, our outlook is that
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decision trees per se may not be sufficient for problems in non-trivial settings and hence we address tree
ensembles which provides a counter-measure to overfitting.
In our previous work [25], we verify safety-critical properties of random forests. Two techniques are
presented, a fast but approximate technique which yields conservative output bounds, and a slower but
precise technique employed when approximations are too conservative. In the precise technique, we partition
the input space of decision trees into disjoint sets, explore all feasible path combinations amongst the trees,
then compute equivalence classes of the entire random forest. Finally, these equivalence classes are checked
against requirements. In this paper, we generalize our original method to other tree ensembles such as
gradient boosting. We also improve our search strategy which we implement in a new tool, yielding a
significant increase in performance.
4. Analyzing Tree Ensembles
In this section, we define a process for verifying learning-based systems, and define a formal method
capable of verifying properties of decision trees and tree ensembles. We also describe VoTE (Verifier of
Tree Ensembles) that implements our method, and illustrate its usage with an example that verifies the
plausibility of range property of tree ensemble classifiers.
4.1. Problem Definition
The software verification process for learning-based systems can be formulated as the following problem
definitions.
Problem 1 (Constraint Satisfaction). Let f : Xn → Rm be a function that is known to implement
some desirable behavior in a system, and a property P specifying additional constraints on the relationship
between x¯ ∈ Xn and y¯ ∈ Rm. Verify that ∀x¯ ∈ Xn, the property P holds for the computations from f .
Since a tree ensemble is a pure function and thus there is no state space to explore, this problem may
be addressed by considering all combinations of paths through trees in the ensemble. Furthermore, by
partitioning the input domain into equivalence classes, i.e. sets of points in the input space that yield
the same output, constraint satisfaction may be verified for regions in the input domain, rather than for
individual points explicitly.
Problem 2 (Equivalence Class Partitioning). For each path combination p in a tree ensemble f :
Xn → Rm, determine the complete set of inputs Xp ⊆ Xn that lead to traversing p, and the corresponding
output y¯p ∈ Rm.
Our method efficiently generates equivalence classes as pairs of (Xp, y¯p), and automatically verifies the
satisfaction of a property P. Assuming that the trees in an ensemble are of equal size, the number of
path combinations in the tree ensemble is 2d·B . In practice, decisions made by the individual trees are
influenced by a subset of features shared amongst several trees within the same ensemble, and thus several
path combinations are infeasible and may be discarded from analysis.
Example 1 (Discarded Path Combination). Consider a tree ensemble with the trees depicted in Fig-
ure 3. There are four path combinations. However, x cannot be less than or equal to zero at the same time
as being greater than five. Consequently, Tree 1 cannot emit 1 at the same time as Tree 2 emits 3, and thus
one path combination may be discarded from analysis.
We postulate that since several path combinations may be discarded from analysis, all equivalence classes
in a tree ensemble may be computed and enumerated within reasonable time for practical applications.
To explore this idea, we developed the tool VoTE2 which automates the computation, enumeration, and
verification of equivalence classes.
2https://github.com/john-tornblom/vote/tree/v0.1.0
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Tree 1 Tree 2
x ≤ 0
0
true
1
false
x ≤ 5
2
true
3
false
Figure 3: Two decision trees that when combined into a tree ensemble, contains three feasible path combinations and one
discarded path combination.
4.2. Tool Overview
VoTE consists of two distinct components, VoTE Core and VoTE Property Checker. VoTE Core takes
as input a tree ensemble f : Xn → Rm, a hyperrectangle defining the input domain Xn (which may include
±∞), and computes all equivalence classes in f . These equivalence classes are then processed by VoTE
Property Checker that checks if all input-output mappings captured by each equivalence class are valid
according to a property P, as illustrated by Figure 4.
Equivalence
Class
(Xp,	y̅p)
Input	Domain
Definition
(Xn)
VoTE
Core
Tree
Ensemble
(f)
VoTE
Property	
Checker
Property
(ℙ)
Result
(PASS/FAIL)
Figure 4: Overview of VoTE.
4.3. Computing Equivalence Classes
There are three distinct tasks being carried out by VoTE Core while computing equivalence classes of a
tree ensemble:
• partitioning the input domain of decision trees into disjoint sets
• exploring all feasible path combinations in the tree ensemble
• deriving output tuples from leaves.
Path exploration is performed by walking the trees depth-first. The order in which intermediate nodes are
considered is described in Section 4.4. When a leaf is hit, the output y¯p for the traversed path combination
p is incremented with the value associated with the leaf, and path exploration continues with the next tree.
The set of inputs Xp is captured by a set of constraints derived from decision functions associated with
internal nodes encountered while traversing p. When all leaves in a path combination have been processed,
an optional post-processing algorithm is applied to y¯p, e.g. a division by the number of trees in the case of
random forests (recall the definition of a random forest in Section 2 which includes a division). Finally, the
VoTE Property Checker checks if the mappings from Xp to y¯p comply with the property P. If the property
holds, the next available path combination is traversed, otherwise verification terminates with a “FAIL” and
provides the most recent (Xp, y¯p) mapping as a counterexample.
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4.4. Node Selection Strategy
Each decision function effectively splits the input domain into smaller pieces throughout the analysis.
When a joint evaluation of two decision functions yields an empty set of points, our method concludes
an infeasible path combination and continues with the next path combination. One way of improving the
performance is to reduce the time spent on analyzing infeasible path combination by discovering them early.
Consider the example depicted in Figure 5. When performing the split as illustrated by the dashed line, the
left-hand slice X4 contains significantly fewer points than the right-hand slice X5. Our method is based on
the idea that by selecting the child nodes in an order based on the number of points captured by each slice,
splits that yield empty sets of points are encountered earlier.
x1
x2
X1
X2
X4 X5
X3
Figure 5: An example used to illustrate our node selection strategy. The dashed line indicate a split of a hyperrectangle into
two pieces. Our node selection strategy considers the piece with the least number of points first.
4.5. Approximating Output Bounds
The output of a tree ensemble may be bounded by analyzing each leaf in the collection of trees exactly
once. Assuming that all trees are of equal size, the number of leaves in a tree ensemble is B · 2d, where B is
the number of trees and d the tree depth, thus making the analysis scale linearly with respect to the number
of trees.
Definition 5 (Approximate Tree Output Bounds). Let t : Xn → Rm be a decision tree with k leaves,
and T = {t(x¯) : ∀x¯ ∈ Xn} the image of t, i.e. the set of output tuples associated with those leaves. We then
approximate the output of t as an interval [t¯min, t¯max], where
t¯min = (min{T1,1, . . . , Tk,1}, . . . ,min{T1,m, . . . , Tk,m}),
t¯max = (max{T1,1, . . . , Tk,1}, . . . ,max{T1,m, . . . , Tk,m}),
and Ti,j denotes the j-th element in the i-th output tuple in T .
Lemma 1 (Sound Tree Output Approximation). The approximate tree output bounds [t¯min, t¯max] of
a decision tree t : Xn → Rm are sound, i.e.
∀x¯ ∈ Xn, t¯min ≤ t(x¯) ≤ t¯max.
Proof. For an arbitrary x¯ ∈ Xn, let t(x¯) = (v1, . . . , vm). Expansion of t¯min ≤ t(x¯) ≤ t¯max then yields
min{T1,1, . . . , Tk,1} ≤ v1 ≤ max{T1,1, . . . , Tk,1}
...
min{T1,m, . . . , Tk,m} ≤ vm ≤ max{T1,m, . . . , Tk,m}.
Since x¯ is drawn from the domain of t, and T is the image of t, then the output scalar vj is captured by T .
Specifically, vj ∈
k⋃
i=1
{Ti,j}. Hence, as per the definition of the max and min set operators,
∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},min{T1,j , . . . , Tk,j} ≤ vj ≤ max{T1,j , . . . , Tk,j}.
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Definition 6 (Approximate Ensemble Output Bounds). Let f : Xn → Rm be an ensemble of B trees
with a post processing algorithm p : Rm → Rm, i.e.
f(x¯) = p(t1(x¯) + . . .+ tB(x¯)),
where ti : Xn → Rm is the i-th tree in the ensemble. We then approximate the output of f as an interval
[y¯min, y¯max], where
y¯min = p(t¯min1 + . . .+ t¯minB ),
y¯max = p(t¯max1 + . . .+ t¯maxB ),
and [t¯mini , t¯maxi ] is the approximate tree output bounds of the i-th tree.
Theorem 1 (Sound Ensemble Output Approximation). The approximate ensemble output bounds
[y¯min, y¯max] of an ensemble f : Xn → Rm with a post processing algorithm p : Rm → Rm are sound if p is
monotonic, i.e.
∀x¯ ∈ Xn, y¯min ≤ f(x¯) ≤ y¯max.
Proof. Using Lemma 1, we know that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , B},∀x¯ ∈ Xn, ti(x¯) ≤ t¯maxi , and that
t1(x¯) + . . .+ tB(x¯) ≤ t¯max1 + . . .+ t¯maxB .
Since p is monotonic, for v¯1, v¯2 ∈ Rm, v¯1 ≤ v¯2 =⇒ p(v¯1) ≤ p(v¯2), it follows that ∀x¯ ∈ Xn,
t1(x¯) + . . .+ tB(x¯) ≤ tmax1 + . . .+ tmaxB =⇒
p(t1(x¯) + . . .+ tB(x¯)) ≤ p(tmax1 + . . .+ tmaxB ) ⇐⇒
f(x¯) ≤ y¯max.
Analogously, the lower bound y¯min is also sound.
These output bounds may be used by a property checker to approximate f in e.g. the plausibility of range
property from Section 2.5. Note that this approximation technique is sound, but not complete. If property
checking does not yield “PASS” with the approximation (see details below), the property P may still hold,
and further analysis of the tree ensemble is required, e.g. by computing all possible equivalence classes
(which is exhaustive and precise).
4.6. Implementation
This section presents implementation details of VoTE Core and VoTE Property Checker, and aspects
that impact accuracy in floating point computations.
4.6.1. VoTE Core
For efficiency, core features in VoTE are implemented as a library in C, and utilize a pipeline architecture
as illustrated by Figure 6 to compute and enumerate equivalence classes. The first processing element in
the pipeline constructs an intermediate mapping from the entire input domain to an output tuple of zeros.
The final processing element applies an optional post-processing algorithm to output tuples, e.g. a division
by the number of trees as in the case of a random forest. In between, there is one refinery element for each
tree that splits intermediate mappings into disjoint regions according to decision functions in the trees, and
increments the output with values carried by the leaves.
To decouple VoTE from any particular machine learning library, a tree ensemble is loaded into memory
by reading a JSON-formatted file from disk. VoTE includes support tools3 to convert random forests trained
by the library scikit-learn [18] and gradient boosting machines trained with CatBoost [19] to this file format.
3https://github.com/john-tornblom/vote/tree/v0.1.0/support
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Initialize
Tree	1
Refinery
...IntermediateMapping
Tree	B
Refinery
Finalize
Intermediate
Mapping
VoTE
Core
Intermediate
Mapping
Intermediate
Mapping
Input	Domain
Definision	(Xn)
Equivalence
Class	(Xp,	y̅p)
Figure 6: Control flow of equivalence class partitioning in VoTE Core.
4.6.2. VoTE Property Checker
VoTE includes two pre-defined property checkers which are parameterized and executed from a command
line interface; the plausibility of range property checker, and the robustness property checker.
The plausibility of range property checker first uses the output bounds approximation to check for
property violations, and resorts to equivalence class analysis only when a violation is detected when using
the approximation.
The robustness property checker checks that all points Xr within a hypercube with sides , centered
around a test point x¯t, map to the same output. Note that selecting which test points to include in the
verification may be problematic. In principle, all points in the input domain should be checked for robustness,
but with classifiers, there is always a hyperplane separating two classes from each other, and thus always
points which violate the robustness property (adjacent to each side of the hyperplane). Hence, the property
is only applicable to points at distances greater than  from any classification boundaries.
VoTE also includes Python bindings for easy prototyping of domain-specific property checkers. Exam-
ple 2 depicts an implementation of the plausibility of range property that uses these Python bindings to do
sanity checking for a classifier’s output.
Example 2 (Plausibility of Range for a Classifier). Ensure that the probability of all classes in every
prediction is within [0, 1].
import sys
import vote
def p l au s i b i l i t y_o f_range (mapping , alpha=0, beta =1):
minval = min ( [ mapping . outputs [ dim ] . lower
for dim in range (mapping . nb_outputs ) ] )
maxval = max( [ mapping . outputs [ dim ] . upper
for dim in range (mapping . nb_outputs ) ] )
return ( minval >= alpha ) and (maxval <= beta )
e = vote . Ensemble ( sys . argv [ 1 ] ) # load model from d i s k
assert e . f o r a l l ( p l au s i b i l i t y_o f_range )
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4.6.3. Computational Accuracy
Implementations of tree ensembles normally approximate real values as floating point numbers, and
thus may suffer from inaccurate computations. In general, VoTE and the software subject to verification
must use the same precision on floating point numbers and prediction function in e.g. Definition 2 to
get a compatible property satisfaction. In this version of VoTE, we use the same representation so that
the calculation errors are the same as in the machine learning library scikit-learn [18] and CatBoost [19].
Specifically, we approximate real values as 32-bit floating point numbers, and implement the prediction
functions literally as presented in e.g. Definition 2, i.e. by first computing the sum of all individual trees,
then dividing by the number of trees. Other machine learning libraries may use 64-bit floating point numbers,
and may implement the prediction function differently, e.g.
f(x¯) =
B∑
b=1
tb(x¯)
B
.
This would be easily changeable in VoTE.
5. Case Studies
In this section, we present an evaluation of VoTE on two case studies from the literature where neural
networks have been analyzed for compliance with interesting properties. Each case study defines a training
set and a test set. We used scikit-learn [18] to train random forests, and CatBoost [19] to train gradient
boosting machines. For random forests, all training parameters except the number of trees and maximum
tree depth were kept constant and at their default values. When training gradient boosting machines, we
also adjusted the learning rate to 0.5 since the default value demonstrated poor accuracy on our case studies.
Furthermore, since gradient boosting machines typically use shallower trees than random forests, we used
different tree depths and number of trees for these types of ensembles. In fact, CatBoost is limited to a
maximum tree depth of 16.
We evaluated accuracy on each trained model against its test set, i.e. the percentage of samples from
the test set where there are no misclassifications, in order to ensure that we were verifying instances that
were interesting enough to evaluate. We then developed verification cases for the plausibility of range
and robustness against noise properties (from Section 2.5) using VoTE. The time spent on verification was
recorded for each trained model as presented below. Next, we evaluated the least-points-first node selection
strategy (from Section 4.4) against two baselines on all case studies (always picking the left child first, and
always picking the right child first).
Experiments were conducted on a single machine with an Intel Core i5 2500K CPU and 16GB RAM.
Furthermore, we used a GeForce GTX 1050 Ti GPU with 4GB of memory to speed up training of gradient
boosting machines.
5.1. Vehicle Collision Detection
In this case study, we verified properties of tree ensembles trained to detect collisions between two
moving vehicles traveling along curved trajectories at different speeds. Each verified model accepts six input
variables, emits two output variables, and contains 20-25 trees with depths between 5-20.
5.1.1. Dataset
We used a simulation tool from Ehlers [7] to generate 30,000 training samples and 3,000 test samples.
Unlike neural networks which Ehlers used in his case study, the size of a tree ensemble is limited by the
amount of data available during training, hence we generated ten times more training data than Ehlers to
ensure that sufficient data is available for the size and number of trees assessed in our case study. Each
sample contains the relative distance between the two vehicles, the speed and starting direction of the second
vehicle, and the rotation speed of both vehicles. Each feature in the dataset is given in normalized form
(position, speed, and direction fall in the range [0, 1], and rotation speed in the range [−1, 1]).
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5.1.2. Robustness
We verified the robustness against noise for all trained models by defining input regions surrounding
each sample in the test set with the robustness margin  = 0.05, which amounts to a 5% change since the
data is normalized. Table 1 lists tree ensembles included in the experiment with their maximum tree depth
d, number of trees B, accuracy of the classifications (Accuracy), elapsed time T during verification, and the
percentage of samples from the test set where there were no misclassifications within the robustness region
(Robustness).
Table 1: Accuracy, robustness, and elapsed verification time (T) of tree ensembles in the vehicle collision detection case study.
Type d B Accuracy (%) Robustness (%) T (s)
RF 10 20 90.4 48.9 56
RF 10 25 90.0 50.3 286
RF 15 20 93.0 34.1 273
RF 15 25 92.9 35.1 1651
RF 20 20 94.2 29.5 367
RF 20 25 94.5 29.6 2520
GB 5 20 93.4 44.5 1
GB 5 25 93.8 40.4 2
GB 10 20 95.5 34.4 26
GB 10 25 95.7 34.0 69
GB 15 20 95.8 34.0 222
GB 15 25 96.0 33.8 511
Increasing the maximum depth of trees increased accuracy on the test set, but reduced the robustness
against noise. Adding more trees to a random forest slightly improves its robustness, while gradient boosting
machines decreased their robustness against noise as more trees were added. These observations suggests
that the models were over-fitted with noiseless examples during training, and thus adding noisy examples
to the training set may improve robustness. The elapsed time during verification was significantly less for
gradient boosting machines than random forests (using the same parameters). The significant difference
in elapsed time between e.g. gradient boosting machines with {d = 5, B = 20} and {d = 15, B = 25}
may seem counter-intuitive at first. However, recall that the theoretical upper limit of the number of path
combinations in a tree ensemble is 2d·B , and that 25·20  215·25.
5.1.3. Node Selection Strategy
Next, we evaluated the least-points-first node selection strategy against the two baseline strategies.
Table 2 lists the elapsed verification time for the evaluated models when using the least-points-first node
selection strategy (T ), always selecting the left child first (Tleft), and always selecting the right child first
(Tright).
The least-points-first node selection strategy was more effective on random forests than on gradient
boosting machines, with speedup factors in the range 1.3–2.5 versus 1.0–1.5, respectively. However, gradient
boosting machines were already significantly easier to verify than random forests (with the same number of
trees and depth).
5.1.4. Scalability
Next, we assessed the scalability of VoTE Core when the number of trees grows by verifying the trivial
property P = true which accepts all input-output mappings. We implemented this trivial property in a
verification case that also counts the number of equivalence classes emitted by VoTE Core. We then executed
the verification case for models trained with a maximum tree depth of d = 10. The recorded number of
equivalence classes C for different number of trees B is depicted in Figure 7 on a logarithmic scale. The
number of equivalence classes increased exponentially as more trees were added, but the magnitude of the
growth decreased for each added tree. The number of equivalence classes for large number of trees are
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Table 2: Elapsed time for different node selection strategies in the vehicle collision detection case study.
Type d B Tleft (s) Tright (s) T (s)
RF 10 20 79 74 56
RF 10 25 422 374 286
RF 15 20 399 441 273
RF 15 25 2351 2457 1651
RF 20 20 930 847 367
RF 20 25 5499 4522 2520
GB 5 20 1 1 1
GB 5 25 3 3 2
GB 10 20 30 31 26
GB 10 25 84 85 69
GB 15 20 265 259 222
GB 15 25 618 616 511
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Figure 7: Number of equivalent classes C on a logarithmic scale from the vehicle collision detection case study for different
number of trees B with a depth d = 10.
significantly smaller than the upper limit of 2d·B (which occurs when there are no shared features amongst
trees, and thus each path combination yields a distinct equivalence class). Furthermore, the gradient boosting
machines consistently yield significantly fewer equivalence classes than random forests, which could explain
the differences in verification times we observed between the two types of models (with the same number of
trees and depth).
5.1.5. Plausibility of Range
Finally, we verified the plausibility of range property (here ensuring that all predicted probabilities are in
the range [0, 1]). All random forests passed the verification case within fractions of a second thanks to the fast
output bound approximation algorithm. For gradient boosting machines however, the output approximations
were too conservative, hence we resorted the precise technique. All gradient boosting machines passed the
verification case, and the elapsed time during verification for different node selection strategies are listed in
Table 3.
The least-points-first node selection strategy consistently outperformed the two baseline strategies, with
speedup factors in the range 1.0–1.2.
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Table 3: Elapsed time for different node selection strategies when verifying gradient boosting machines in the vehicle collision
detection case study.
d B Tleft (s) Tright (s) T (s)
5 20 2 2 2
5 25 10 10 9
10 20 304 289 260
10 25 1067 1015 917
15 20 3032 3230 2910
15 25 10582 9900 8750
5.2. Digit Recognition
In this case study, we verified properties of tree ensembles trained to recognize images of hand-written
digits.
5.2.1. Dataset
The MNIST dataset [16] is a collection of hand-written digits commonly used to evaluate machine learning
algorithms. The dataset contains 70,000 gray scale images with a resolution of 28x28 pixels at 8bpp, encoded
as tuples of 784 scalars. We randomized the dataset and split into two subsets; a 85% training set, and a
15% test set (a similar split was used in [16]).
5.2.2. Robustness
We defined input regions surrounding each sample in the test set with the robustness margin  = 1,
which amounts to a 0.5% lightning change per pixel in a 8bpp gray-scaled image. Each input region contains
2784 noisy images, which would be be too many for VoTE to handle within a reasonable amount of time.
Consequently, we reduced the complexity of the problem significantly by only considering robustness against
noise within a sliding window of 5x5 pixels. For a given sample from the test set, noise was added within
the 5x5 window, yielding 25·5 noisy images. This operation was then repeated on the original image, but
with the window placed at an offset of 1px relative to its previous position. Applying this operation on an
entire image yields 25·5 · (28− 5)2 ≈ 234 distinct noisy images per sample from the test set, and about 1014
noisy images when applied to the entire test set.
Figure 8 depicts one of many examples from the MNIST dataset that were misclassified by the tree
ensemble with B = 25 and d = 10. Since the added noise is invisible to the naked eye, the noise (a single
pixel) is highlighted in red.
Figure 8: A missclassified noisy sample from the MNIST dataset.
Table 4 lists tree ensembles included in the experiment with their maximum tree depth d, number of trees
B, accuracy on the test set (Accuracy), elapsed time T during verification, and the percentage of samples
from the test set where there were no misclassifications within the robustness region (Robustness).
Increasing the complexity of a tree ensemble slightly increased its accuracy, and significantly increased
its robustness against noise. The elapsed time during verification was significantly less for gradient boosting
machines than random forests (using the same parameters).
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Table 4: Accuracy and robustness of tree ensembles in the digit recognition case study.
Type d B Accuracy (%) Robustness (%) T (s)
RF 10 20 93.8 75.2 254
RF 10 25 94.2 74.8 1217
RF 15 20 95.8 82.8 436
RF 15 25 96.0 84.0 2141
RF 20 20 96.0 82.3 391
RF 20 25 96.4 83.7 1552
GB 5 75 94.5 60.9 129
GB 5 150 95.3 67.3 301
GB 5 300 95.7 68.6 1551
GB 10 25 94.9 65.8 82
GB 10 50 95.7 73.9 159
GB 10 100 96.3 78.8 486
5.2.3. Node Selection Strategy
Next, we evaluated the least-points-first node selection strategy against the two baseline strategies.
Table 5 lists the elapsed verification time for the evaluated models while using the least-points-first node
selection strategy (T), always selecting the left child first (Tleft), and always selecting the right child first
(Tright).
Table 5: Elapsed time for different child node selection strategies in the digit recognition case study.
Type d B Tleft (s) Tright (s) T (s)
RF 10 20 2009 1093 254
RF 10 25 10724 5386 1217
RF 15 20 4474 1837 436
RF 15 25 23718 8960 2141
RF 20 20 4037 1817 391
RF 20 25 17360 7228 1552
GB 5 75 836 376 129
GB 5 150 2419 848 301
GB 5 300 18829 4717 1551
GB 10 25 442 268 82
GB 10 50 1157 561 159
GB 10 100 5772 1618 486
The effectiveness of our node selection strategy was similar for both random forests and gradient boosting
machines, with significant speed up factors in the range 4.2–11.2 and 2.8–12.1, respectively.
5.2.4. Scalability
Next, we assessed the scalability of VoTE Core when the number of trees grows by verifying the trivial
property P = true. This was done in a similar way as described in the vehicle collision detection use case
presented in Section 5.1.4. We then executed the verification case for all models with a tree depth of d = 10.
Enumerating all possible equivalence classes was intractable for tree ensembles with more than B = 4 trees.
We aborted the experiment after running the verification case with a tree ensembles of B = 5 for 72h.
Figure 9 depicts the four data points we managed to acquire for the two types of models.
The number of equivalence classes increased exponentially as more trees were added, without demon-
strating any signs of stagnation. The ability to discard infeasible path combinations in a tree ensembles is an
essential ingredient to our method. When tree ensembles are trained on high-dimensional data, the number
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Figure 9: Number of equivalent classes C on a logarithmic scale from the digit recognition case study for different number of
trees B with a depth d = 10.
of features shared between trees is relatively low, so it is not surprising that our method experiences com-
binatorial path explosion. This shows that in non-trivial applications, transforming domain knowledge into
reasonable constraints in the form of a property P is a useful means of addressing combinatorial problems
in verification.
5.2.5. Plausibility of Range
Finally, we verified the plausibility of range property (again ensuring that that all predicted probabilities
are in the range [0, 1]). All random forests passed the verification case within fractions of a second thanks
to the fast output bound approximation algorithm. For gradient boosting machines however, the output
approximations were too conservative. Since the precise technique does not scale well on models trained
on high-dimensional data, we were unable to verify the plausibility of range property of gradient boosting
machines in this case study.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a method to formally verify properties of tree ensembles. Our method exploits
the fact that several trees make decisions based on a shared subset of the input variables, and thus several
path combinations in tree ensembles are infeasible. We implemented the method in a tool called VoTE, and
demonstrated its scalability on two case studies.
In the first case study, a collision detection problem with six input variables, we demonstrated that
problems with a low-dimensional input space can be verified using our method within a reasonable amount
of time. In the second case study, a digit recognition problem with 784 input variables, we demonstrated
that our method copes with high-dimensional input space when verifying robustness against noise. But it
does so only if the systematically introduced noise does not attempt to exhaustively cover all possibilities.
Since the number of shared input variables between trees is low, we observed a combinatorial explosion of
paths in the tree ensembles. This combinatorial explosion also appeared when we verified the plausibility of
range property of gradient boosting machines where the fast approximation technique was too conservative.
However, when verifying the plausibility of range property of random forests, the approximation technique
was sufficiently accurate, and verification was completed within seconds.
For future work, we plan to investigate different tree selection strategies, i.e. strategies that determine
in which order trees in an ensemble are analyzed. We also consider combining our approximation technique
with our precise technique into an abstraction-refinement scheme. Other directions of work include creating
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new properties that are meaningful in the context of the problem at hand, e.g. decisive classifications, and
applying to use cases where control is involved (and not only sensing).
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